(WPFC/IFEX) – The following is a WPFC memorandum, followed by WPFC European Representative Ronald Koven’s comments on the Afghan Interim Administration Press Law Edict of 20 February 2002: May 9, 2002 Memorandum: To: News Editors and others concerned about press freedom in Afghanistan From: Marilyn Greene, World Press Freedom Committee Re: Regressive new media law […]
(WPFC/IFEX) – The following is a WPFC memorandum, followed by WPFC European Representative Ronald Koven’s comments on the Afghan Interim Administration Press Law Edict of 20 February 2002:
May 9, 2002
Memorandum:
To: News Editors and others concerned about press freedom in Afghanistan
From: Marilyn Greene, World Press Freedom Committee
Re: Regressive new media law in Afghanistan
The United States is understandably concerned about the reconstruction of a democratic Afghanistan, since of course a free and open society is a better business and political partner than is a closed, autocratic system. Wars rarely break out between societies that can engage in open dialogue to resolve their differences.
It is puzzling and alarming, then, to note the deafening silence from Washington and other democratic nations with regard to the almost surreptitious adoption in Afghanistan of a “new” press law that is actually rife with restrictions and prohibitions more appropriate to a dictatorship than to a developing democracy.
The World Press Freedom Committee’s European representative, Ronald Koven, has examined the new law and notes its deficiencies in an attached memorandum.
Marilyn Greene
Executive Director
World Press Freedom Committee
Comments by Ronald Koven
European Representative, World Press Freedom Committee,
On Afghan Interim Administration Press Law Edict of 20 Feb. 2002
Afghanistan’s Interim Administration of Hamid Karzai has slightly revised a very restrictive draft press law and put it in force by a decree dated 20 Feb. 2002 and signed by Karzai.
Despite some editing, the edict’s thrust is virtually the same as that of an earlier draft law on which we commented earlier.
The edict creates a rather elaborate press and periodical registration and licensing system that is subject to the obvious abuses inherent in such arrangements, along with what amounts to licensing of individual journalists.
The text goes on to create a set of extraneous, largely unpredictable problems by stating that any offenses not provided for within the law in question shall be subject to the Sharia. That seems to raise the prospect of journalists some day having limbs amputated, or worse, for unstipulated offenses.
The problems are with the philosophy of press freedom as well as the specific arrangements called for in the text.
Art. 2 calls for the “healthy development of media” as “an effective tool” to be used to publicize culture and to “reflect public opinion in an honest and effective way to the society.”
Why should the press not be free to influence public opinion as well as to reflect it? And who is to decide what constitutes an honest and effective way to do this?
In Art. 3, media are divided into categories, including “private press” (c.) These are defined as belonging to a self-financed “person having the license.” Aside from the obvious difficulty that under a press freedom system no license should be needed, there is no provision for legal
entities such as companies or corporations to enjoy private ownership.
A licensee is revealingly defined as a “concessionaire.” This clearly indicates that publishing is not a right but a privilege granted on sufferance of the State. There is a suggestion in the revised definition that such a “concessionaire” could be a corporate body. Previously, it could be a single person only.
Art. 4 and Art. 11 provide that only Afghan citizens may publish or print publications. This is also the case in a number of advanced democracies. But elsewhere provision is generally made to allow at least partial foreign ownership through investment. If investment must be self-generated by Afghans only, there will be major problems kick-starting an independent private press.
Experience shows, however, that allowing foreign owners to publish has given the press the strength to stand up to pressure from authoritarian-minded government leaders in countries in transition. Hungary has been the most dramatic example of this.
The only provision for foreign-owned news media to be published in Afghanistan is for “news bulletins observing diplomatic norms” published by international organizations and agencies. They must have “permission” of the information ministry
Art. 16 establishes a “monopoly of the government” over broadcasting. Mixed systems of public and private broadcasting have become the norm in most of the world. Yet, the revised Art. 16 now confusingly suggests that “audiovisual means” may also be established by “Afghan citizens, political parties [and] organization[s].”
Art. 19 states that a media owner must have written permission from the Information and Culture Ministry. While this is objectionable in principle to begin with, the text does not even state the criteria for granting or withholding such permission.
The article does say that a media owner must not have been “deprived of civil rights” by a court. The obvious danger is that a court may deprive a citizen of civil rights precisely for the purpose of depriving someone of the right to own media outlets.
Art. 22 creates an appeals mechanism from an Information Ministry denial of the right to publish, but the text also provides that one of the three members of the review commission for that purpose represents the very ministry that would have denied the permission in the first place. So, the review commission, which is objectionable to begin with, can hardly be described as being independent.
Art. 24 provides for large amounts to be placed on deposit as guarantees against future fines. Such a system creates very broad opportunities for abuse and may also serve as a financial barrier to entering the media in the first place.
Art. 27 is the kernel of a journalists’ licensing system. It stipulates that the editor in chief of a publication must have at least three years’ journalism or other professional training. It does not say what constitutes “experience” and who rules on that.
This article also says that the editor must be at least 24 years old. What about the head of a youth or student publication?
Art. 30 is an insult law. It bars blasphemy against Islam and other religions, undefined “subjects that dishonor the people,” or material that might weaken the Afghan army, as well as photos that cause “moral corruption.”
Art. 34 bans pen names over “criticizing essays.”
Art. 37 provides for an unacceptable warning system leading to suspension or cancellation of the “concession” of a publication. The information minister may suspend the publication for a year, and a court may permanently cancel the publishing license. These stipulations could only have a chilling effect on press freedom.
Art. 39 provides that undefined crimes not stipulated in the press law may be pursued under the Sharia.
Art. 40 subjects the distribution of foreign press and films imported from abroad to prior permission from the Information Ministry .
All in all, I have not seen a press law text with so many serious problems of a fundamental nature. This text needs to be reviewed from start to finish. In fact, it would be far better not to have a law of this nature at all. What is needed is a basic guarantee of freedom of expression and of the press in the constitution — not a press under official surveillance as provided for by this text.