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Appeals To

His Excellency Mohammad Hosni Mubarak

President of the Arab Republic of Egypt

Oruba Palace

Heliopolis, Cairo, Egypt

Fax: +202 260 5417

Farouk Seif al-Naser

Minister of Justice

Lazoghly Square

Mounira, Cairo, Egypt

Fax: +202 355 5700

Amir Moussa

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Cairo, Egypt

Fax: +202 574 9149

Please copy appeals to the originator if possible.

By Steve Negusk

“Middle East Times” staff

“You can see it in the television retrospectives, the

government-sponsored seminars — the `Age of Mubarak,’ 15 years

characterized by slow but steady progress towards peace,

development, democracy. Years from now, when the insiders start

publishing their memoirs, we may subdivide the past 15 years into

the Safwat Sherif era, the Mohammed Abu Ghazala epoch, the

Zakariya Azmi years, the ascendancy of Farid Khamis. But for now,

we’re living in the Age of Mubarak.

“The accomplishments of the past decade and a half are real

enough. Privatization is well underway. Egypt’s public debt has

fallen from $40 billion to $30.9 billion. Foreign currency

reserves have climbed to $18 billion from $4.9 billion in 1982.

The pound is stable; inflation is under control. Population

growth has been brought under control — according to official

statistics, the rate of increase is now approaching 2 per cent;

10 years ago it was 2.8. The economy is supposed to be growing at

4 per cent each year; inflation is supposed to be down to 7 per

cent. The country is   stable: few serious observers think there

is any chance of a violent change in regime in the near future.

Egypt looks good on paper. For the first time, the business world

finds a government which understands the interests of investors –

– business, in fact, appears to be slowly replacing the military

as the most influential force in policy-making. Figures such as

American Chamber of Commerce boss Shafik Gabr — representative

of a new generation of ambitious businessmen — can publicly call

for the privatization of the media, a direct challenge to some of

Egypt’s powerful old statists. (Though with the political

leadership so indebted to the Information Minister, it will be

interesting to see how far business can push that one.)

“The vast majority of Egyptians, though, will tell you that they

must work longer and harder for less purchasing power than ever

before. The hopes that Sadat offered the Egyptians of the 1970s

mean little to most. The Gulf labor market is dead, the benefits

of American foreign aid are not widely seen or appreciated, and

Egyptian diplomats freely admit   that the vision of a free

Middle East market is dying alongside the peace process. Tourism

has proven to be fickle — entrepreneurs have made fortunes, but

employees have seen their job security shrink with every bomb

blast. Egypt’s infrastructure has approached the level of the

so-called first world, particularly in communications — 20 years

ago, the anecdote goes, the best way to make a cross-town phone

call was to go through Cyprus. Some “informal areas” — slums —

that were once totally neglected now enjoy lighting, sewers, and

health services. There are more highways, and they are better lit

and better metaled than ever before. But improvements have not

kept pace with the volume of traffic. The transportation system

is, by some calculations, the deadliest in the world.

“Diplomatically, Egypt has come far under Mubarak. In 1981, Egypt

had been expelled from the Arab League; today, Egypt hosts the

Arab League and has clear pretensions to lead it a la Nasser.

Mubarak restored relations with the rest of the Arab world, and

no doubt this is due largely to his personal style of one-on-one

diplomacy — friendly, as opposed to Sadat’s arrogance. This

prestige ensures Egypt its steady flow of aid money. But

otherwise, it does little for ordinary citizens. American and

European consular officials are no more likely to grant them

entry visas; Saudi employers are no less reluctant to kick them

out — without wages — at the   slightest transgression. The

last 15 years have not revived the trust between citizen and

government which was born under Nasser, and began to die under

Sadat. For nine years, well over half of the Mubarak age, the

government was headed by Prime Minister Atef Sidki. This figure,

utterly devoid of any charisma or leadership, came to symbolize

all the incompetence, hesitancy, indifference, or downright

cruelty that could be found in the government. Even the

semi-official newspapers mocked him shamelessly. Sidki summed up

his approach to government when he visited the Upper Egyptian

village Dronka in November 1994, after 500 people burned to death

in a firestorm. He no doubt had in mind the 1992 earthquake, when

survivors criticized the government for moving too slowly. In

Dronka, Sidki was jovial. `The problem is limited because they

are all dead. Limited in complaining, I mean,’ he told reporters.

`Who will complain — a dead man?’

“The great political liberalizations of the Mubarak regime

occurred in the first half of his administration. They peaked

around 1987, with the election of a parliament dominated

one-third by the opposition. But the last few years, particularly

1995, saw the erosion of those democratic gains. The year-long

press law campaign humiliated the opposition parties, and while

it left them with their freedoms essentially intact, it showed

them that those freedoms were a matter of presidential whim. The

People’s   Assembly elections told the parties that, though their

participation in elections was welcomed cosmetically, they could

never expect a real share in power. In his early years, the

president seemed humble, down-to-earth, responsive to public

opinion. He tolerated rivals — such as the charismatic Defense

Minister Mohammed Abu Ghazala — and allowed the Muslim

Brotherhood to build up a vast counter-government with its

Islamic banks, charitable works, and syndicate politics. Robert

Springborg, in a book considered by many to be the definitive

work on Mubarak’s first years, argued that the president had

presided over `The Fragmentation of the Political Order’.

Acceptable to everybody, and reluctant to take any personal

political stands that would offend one faction or another,

Mubarak had allowed Egyptian politics to become as pluralist as

ever.

“This only lasted a little while. Since the Gulf War, and

particularly since the Addis Ababa assassination attempt of 1995,

we see a growing personality cult. The man who, when he came to

power, allowed his predecessor’s brother to be tried for

corruption, refuses to allow any attack at all on his own family.

Television offers him tributes that would make Sadat blush,

singers sing his praises, newspapers fill up entire pages with

his pictures.

“Mubarak could hardly help being perceived as a great political

liberal. In September 1981, right before he became president,

Sadat had seemingly lost his senses and imprisoned hundreds of

the country’s leading intellectuals. The first thing Mubarak did

was release them, earning from many of them lifetime support and

establishing his human rights credentials. With less fanfare,

however, he has allowed the destruction of the Islamist

sub-culture, whose skills and energy, if properly channeled into

development, could have done much for Egypt. In 1990, the

security forces unleashed a campaign against the Gamaa Islamiya

that over the next five years has claimed at least 1,000 lives,

and led to the incarceration or exile of many of Egypt’s best and

brightest. Egypt has more political prisoners in its jails then

ever before in its history; human rights groups begin the

estimates at 16,000 and it climbs upwards to 30,000. After the

military trials of Muslim Brotherhood civilians, who had never

been accused of any act of violence, the most active social

workers were imprisoned, and   most of the rest have fled the

country. The campaign against the   Brotherhood, its

ramifications for democracy aside, has cost many of the poorest

citizens of Egypt the social services that could make their life

bearable.

“One could argue that, in crushing the Islamists, Mubarak has

saved the country from a reactionary movement which would have

trampled upon the rights of women, Christians, and free-thinkers.

Has he? The government claims that it is as conservative as

anyone, and does little to rein in cultural or social

reactionaries. Friday preachers may launch firey attacks on

feminists and secularists — as long as they don’t talk politics.

Jihan’s Law — probably the single most important piece of

legislation for women, which extended their property rights

during divorce — was repealed. Running up against strong

resistance from traditionalists, the government has for all

purposes abandoned its campaign against female circumcision. As

for Christians, the government will not appoint them to any real

position of political power, they rarely are given permission to

build a church, they may not proselytize among Muslims, and they

can do little to confront Muslim proselytizing among their own.

Free-thinkers? No one can proclaim him or herself an atheist.

Only the most orthodox version of Sunni Islam may be discussed in

public; Nasser Hamed Abu Zeid remains in exile.

“The freedoms allowed today which it is claimed would not exist

under an Islamist government are few — bellydancing, racy movies

and song lyrics, Stella beer, sexual freedom behind closed doors

for the few who are lucky enough to afford furnished flats. Many

of Egypt’s literati argue that the country has fallen into a

cultural malaise. Cinema produces only a few films each year;

Abdel Halim Hafez and Um Kalthoum have been replaced by Amr Diab.

This cliche — the decline of Egyptian culture — is highly

questionable, however. Some would argue that, in artistic skill

and handling of controversy, films like `Irhab Wa Kebab’

(`Terrorism and Kebab’), `Mercedes’, `Ya Dunia Ya Gharami’ (`The

world, my love’), and `Afarit Al Asfalt’ (`Demons of the

Asphalt’) are worth dozens of Abdel Halim singing vehicles or

Leila Murad romantic comedies, even if they lack the nostalgia

appeal. Mini-series like those produced by Osama Anwar Okasha are

more engaging and candid than anything that came out on

television in previous decades.   Unknown authors write

literature the equal of anything by Naguib Mahfouz, Edwar Al

Kharrat, or Gamal Al Ghitany — they just tend to be ignored by

the big literary magazines. Whatever can be said about the last

15 years, Egypt has more potential — both economically and

politically — than ever before. The government’s caveat —

suffer now, enjoy an economic boom later — is  probably true.

But this progress was laced with unnecessary suffering. The men

in charge did what had to be done, but for the most part they did

it slowly, badly, and without much compassion for those who would

be affected by it. They must take responsibility for the

frustrations felt by millions of Egyptian youth who thought they

might one day find a job and start a family, and the humiliations

inflicted on salaried workers who thought they would be able to

support their dependents.”