The Myanmar Internet Project has detailed the surveillance tools and programs initiated by the military government.
This statement was originally published on eng.mizzima.com on 27 April 2025.
Myanmar’s military junta or the State Administration Council (SAC) has started using a suite of technologies to effectively identify, track and locate dissidents in Myanmar starting from March 2025, according to a report by the Myanmar Internet Project (MIP) released on 26 April.
The digital repression tactics by the junta have escalated significantly four years after the coup. The MIP has documented 357 instances of internet shutdowns since the coup until the end of March 2025. Conflict affected and contested areas are frequently subjected to a form of internet shutdown and Sagaing Region and Kachin State are regarded as areas facing most instances of the internet shutdown situation in Myanmar. Internet shutdowns are often observed in contested or liberated areas while areas and the populace under military control are heavily subjected to the junta’s surveillance mechanisms
EVOLUTION OF SURVEILLANCE
Throughout this four-year period, the military junta have undertaken steps to build up on the remnant and existing surveillance mechanisms that were implemented during the civilian government’s tenure. Additionally, the MIP has observed their strategy to transform Myanmar’s cyber space into a surveillance assemblage and an ecosystem.
The military junta has been building up a National Database as a surveillance assembly, composed of NRIC (National Registration Identity-Identification Card), SIM registration as well as information from other services.
We regard recently emerged and widely discussed technologies such as Guest List Management System (GLMS) – implemented in accommodation facilities; Person Scrutinizing and Monitoring System (PSMS), Myanmar Advanced Passenger Processing System (MAPPS) – implemented at Airports, and National Service Information Management System (NSIMS) – for identifying conscription eligible travelers, as one of the functional apparatuses of an assembly of a centralized database containing identification information of citizens.
This surveillance assembly’s inception was initiated with Sim Registration in Myanmar as part of the e-Government project, first in 2016-17 and the second time in 2019-2020 under the civilian government’s leadership. The junta continued strict enforcement of sim registration after the coup. Telenor’s exit from Myanmar was cited due to their inability to comply with the junta’s requests. Additionally, as Telenor’s operations were sold to become Atom, its users were forced and coerced to register their sim cards.
NATIONAL DATABASE
2022 September’s announcement from the Junta’s Ministry of Transport and Communications revealed not only the completion of digitization and registration of 52 million populace by the
Ministry of Immigration and Population with ‘e-ID Biographic Registration Software’ technology as a ‘National Database’, but also their plan to conduct cross check verification of the digitized database with the Sim Registration information. This marked the first instance of the ‘National Database’ and its presence being made publicly known. Soon after, at the end of October 2022, the Ministry of Transport and Communications called for tender to establish ‘SIM Registration Management System’ and allocated Universal Service Fund (USF) for the project. The tender was awarded to Naung Yoe Company for $2.3 million in November 2022 per black market pricing throughout the four-year project period in April 2023.
The Ministry of Transport and Communications later announced termination of Sim cards failing to comply with the sim registration requirements with the 2023 January 31st deadline for registration. Sim registration is (still) strictly enforced later on. In 2023 May, Atom went as far as to triangulate and notify incorrectly registered sims with SMS that contained the location of the nearest Atom Digital Store to the user. Currently, new sim cards are reportedly barred from receiving OTP codes for registration with VoIP communication and instant apps such as Telegram and Signal.
MONITORING THE PUBLIC
The junta heavily monitors and scrutinizes the public’s communications. Even before the coup, interception technologies were present in Myanmar: Justice for Myanmar investigated installation of LIG (Lawful Interception Gateways) on Telenor’s infrastructure in February 2018.
The junta’s 2021 amendment of the Law Protecting Privacy and Security of the Citizens also provided pave way for the junta for interception of communications legally in addition to installing interception tools on local internet service providers.
An anonymous source from the Myanmar Police Force revealed to the media about the formation of Cyber Security Team under the directive of the Ministry of Transport and Communications for monitoring and scrutinizing of cellular calls and SMS messages. The interview indicated the use of Artificial Intelligence-like technology for keyword recognition and automatic flagging for SMS and phone calls containing words such as “Revolution” and “Protest”. Additionally, due to the inherent way of cellular communication protocol, the users may be able to be triangulated to their approximate locations during and after making these communications.
TELENOR EXIT
Telenor cited these concerns during their exit from the Myanmar market. MIP assumes that in this post telecom exodus era, all mobile operators may have been equipped with interception technologies.
While the above address the technical framework and capabilities, the junta have also undertaken significant legislative changes and enactments to systematically streamline the interception process. 2023 March promulgation of Lawful Interception Framework as Chapter 14 addendum to the Counter-Terrorism Law provided, framework, roles, responsibilities, and modus operandi for (un)lawful interception requests. The law is deliberately designed to have no multi-stakeholder oversight whatsoever: as the Central Committee, exclusively appointed by the junta’s Ministry of Home Affairs, holds all the decision-making power.
Additionally, the Counter-terrorism law in Myanmar mandated formation of the Central Committee chaired by the Union Minister of the Ministry of home affairs with sweeping power for arbitrary interception, blocking and restriction of communications of users.
WATCHING MONEY FLOWS
The junta have also been keeping a close scrutiny on the mobile transactions and the money trails toward the resistance and revolution forces. Monitoring and suspension of mobile banking wallets such as KBZ Pay and Wave Pay are widely reported.
Although the incidents of suspension and termination of banking accounts and mobile wallets started emerging in April 2021, media reported that banks have started submitting daily transaction records to the Junta starting from mid/early February 2021.
The junta also enforced strict compliance with the banking KYC (Know Your Customer) information for the users and announced permanent termination of the accounts failing to comply with the requirements on 2022 September. A directive also required wallet representatives to acquire KYC information and phone numbers from the wallet customers and were also required to install CCTV cameras in their shop as record. Whereas the banks and relevant institutions have yet to produce figures and information regarding this, a leaked meeting minutes from presumably 2022 December indicated that over 18,000 wallet accounts and bank accounts were terminated during the unspecified 18 months period.
SOCIAL MEDIA WATCH
In Facebook-dominant Myanmar, the junta and its apparatus not only block and censor access to Facebook, they also heavily dissenting opinions and users on social media. This kind of social monitoring activity echoes the establishment of the Social Media Monitoring Team (SMMT) that was established under the civilian government leadership with a budget of $6 million in 2018. There was no transparency nor report around the activities, roles and responsibilities of the team.
Social media activities around dissenting opinions such as posts, shares and comments usually end up in having the user’s identity, physical addresses and photos being shared and circulated and doxxed on an alternative platform – which is Telegram – among many of the junta’s lobbyist and propaganda channels. This has put many behind bars or worse. These channels also wage unbridled harassment campaigns especially targeting women activists with sexual harassment, circulation of NCII (Non-consensual intimate imagery) contents, videos and death threats.
Arrests of users for participation in the Flower Strike, online protests, and due surprise checks, netizens have started to refrain themselves from online activities such as sharing, commenting and interacting with revolution related contents. Data for Myanmar have documented the arrest of 1,691 personnel due to their online expression on social media or online communications opposing the Myanmar military and supporting pro-democracy movements and resistance groups within February 2022 to February 2024. In 2024 alone, the MIP has also tracked the arrest of at least 373 personnel who were arrested based on their expression on Facebook, TikTok and Telegram. This campaign of terror is one of the many mechanisms of digital oppression in Myanmar.
SURVEILLANCE EVERYWHERE
Blurring lines between physical and digital life; internet activity, CCTV records, biographic and biometric data – have made it possible to profile potential threats based on these data, according to the MIP report. The junta have been utilizing this comprehensive suite of technologies to profile, track, identify and monitor CDM personnel, conscription eligible youths, and activists. Everyone is under the ever-watchful eyes whenever they travel, communicate, connect to the internet and interact on social media. This seriously erodes basic human rights and freedom of expression.
Sensitive personnel will have to navigate with great care in this environment, especially if they have their biographic data documented by the Junta, while being left out of this assembly may also single them out for easy filtering. Additionally, UID becoming a mandatory requirement for passport applications has populated the National Database servers with the required data.
Wearing a mask when going out, encrypting data during travel, permanent and secure deletion of data, use of end-to-end encrypted communication and access to reliable and private VPN are becoming essential survival tips in Myanmar. Only then may there be a level of mitigation and resilience against this ever-increasing surveillance.
This comprehensive suite of tools and oppression apparatus have made Myanmar a comprehensive ubiquitous surveillance state that has no regard for individual freedom. Freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom against arbitrary detention, freedom of movement and rights to life have eroded fundamentally in Myanmar. Myanmar people will have to be extra vigilant and resilient to navigate against this surveillance that often leads to detention or worse.
